Captain Obvious: Piggyback mortgages make loan modification harder

by Morgan on December 31, 2008

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Bloomberg reports today on Fed findings that state that (OMG!) piggyback mortgages are making it harder for homeowners to modify the terms of their existing first mortgages. No sh&$ Sherlock. Really? This is newsbreaking stuff here. 2nd lien holders who purchased piggyback 2nd mortgages are in a terrible position, althought it may be in their interest to get the first loan modification done, especially in bubble states where they’re basically holding air.

What are Piggyback 2nd Mortgages?

For those of you not overly familiar with the parlance of the early 2000’s housing boom, a piggyback mortgage is a 2nd mortgage used at the time of purchase (or refinancing) so that the first mortgage is kept below 80% of the value of the house to avoid mortgage insurance costs. The 2nd, piggyback mortgage makes up the difference of the financing, usually 100% to make it cheaper to buy (um, borrow) a home from the bank.

These loans were super-popular because it allowed you to either 1) by a home with no money down or 2) refinance and pull cash out of your existing home up to 100% of the property value.  Granted you’re now stuck with a huge loan and often with an adjustable rate first loan and a high-interest rate 2nd, but you got the cash and you were happy.

Until things started to get nasty.

Most Piggyback 2nds Aren’t Worth the Paper They’re Printed On

Nowadays, these piggyback 2nds are litterally unsecured debt.  Like a credit card.  The property values where this type of financing was popular (CA, FL, NV, AZ) have tanked more than 20% in most places rendering the 2nd lien completely unsecured.  Because the 2nd lien is subordinate to the first, they have no right to the devalued property ahead of the first lien holder in the event of a default.  So they just sit nervously chewing their nails and hoping the monthly payments continue to roll in until the tide starts to rise again.  That’s a long time to be biting your nails.

Companies like Wells Fargo, who hold millions of dollars in 2nd mortgages in states like California are very jumpy because these piggyback mortgages are starting to default at alarming rates.  More people are figuring out that they’d rather just not pay a loan that is $100,000 more than the value of the home and are walking away.

Piggyback Holders Make Loan Modifications Tough

There are several reasons that piggyback mortgages make loan modifications tough (and short sales for that matter).  First, is the overwhelming complexity of trying to get approvals lined up.  Most piggyback mortgages are not held by the originating party and therefore the servicing companies have to track down the final holder of the note and get approvals to allow the note to be subordinated to a new first mortgage (the one being modified).  If the 2nd mortgage is in some type of security that has been sliced and diced with many investors holding some interest it can be even tougher.  Second, as we’ve already covered, the 2nd lien holder is already in a precarious position due to the plummenting house values.  And a loan modification request is a sure sign of a borrower in distress which doesn’t bode well for the 2nd lien holder if the market keeps dropping.  The 2nd mortgage holder may decide that they’d rather take their chance with a foreclosure now and try to recoup something out of the deal instead of waiting as the housing market continues to tank.

Piggyback Holders May Want to Consider Approving Some Loan Modifications

2nd mortgage holders may consider allowing loan modifications in situations where either they have no options.  Such as a home that is completely underwater and they’re left in a position where the note is now basically an unsecured debt.  In this instance their only chance at recovering the debt is to give the homeowner the best chance at repaying it.  This chance can be improved by allowing the first mortgage to be modified to provide a more manageable monthly payment.  (But this is a bit of a pipe dream, since more than half of all modified mortgages are still defaulting.)

Alternatively, if they have a very good security position they may consider allowing a modification because they’d rather make the money on the interest and servicing while knowing that they’ll be compensated to one degree or another in a foreclosure proceeding.  (This, again is a bit of a pipe dream because I can’t think of too many areas where properties have appreciated to the point where original 100% financing is now, say, 85-90% of the home value.)

Piggyback Mortgage Holders are Going to Eat It - Big

Wells Fargo and other holders of millions of dollars of second mortgages are going to find themselves taking massive losses on these portfolios over the next several years.  With the housing market continuing to tank, the likelihood of cram-downs as a relief tactic increasing, and the job market crashing it is easy to make an argument that most of these 2nd mortgages aren’t worth 10 cents on the dollar.

Not that it won’t be deserved.  If you were out there buying up portfolios and pools of piggyback 2nd mortgages with 100% financing to people with 580 credit scores you deserve to eat it.  It’s just too bad that the taxpayers will end up paying for your bad decisions too.

Advertisement: Learn how you can do your own loan modification, click here.

Last 3 posts by Morgan

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Viewing 78 Comments

    • ^
    • v
    It's so upsetting that people couldn't be more rational and not get these jumbo loans.
    • ^
    • v
    Hi John,

    It's not just jumbo loans. Any sized loan could go to 100%. It's just a shame that people kept maxing out their house value with 100% financing time after time, fueling an unsustainable lifestyle.
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bright as the sun on that California coast
    He was a midwestern boy on his own
    She looked at him with those soft eyes,
    So innocent and blue
    He knew right then he was too far from home he was too far from home".
    • ^
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    Fielding,

    What's funny was the underwriting and risk guidelines that gave them the confidence to go behind an option ARM. Banks justified going behind neg-am notes by simply grossing up the current loan value to 115%. Supposedly that extra 15% was to protect them from the effects of negative amortization.

    We know that a 15% cushion is laughable with the combined effects of negative amortization and downward housing prices.

    The risk analysis on this stuff was so poor and so short sighted. Amazing.
    • ^
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    FM's comments are interesting and correct as to the facts: WFHM did the firsts and Wells Fargo Bank did the seconds. I quibble a little about the ulitimate difference, though. WFHM, I believe, purchased megatons of Ocwen and Ameriquest waste (whatever Citi couldn't stomach?). For whatever reason, WF is not associated with bad paper, but most of my research suggests they are likely the biggest holder still standing.

    Another implication of what FM is saying was the instant 2nd origination platform that WFB used, along all the other biggies. Based on a glorified credit check, Wells would be ready to close in minutes (no title or appraisal). I am told this is an unbelievable cluster ....
    • ^
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    And, now that WF has combined with Wachovia (official today) they now are sitting on piles of bad 2nd mortgages and ticking time-bombs that are the Option ARMs. This is going to end badly, very badly.
    • ^
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    Oh, and I forgot: Fannie and Freddie limit to $3000 what a second mortgagee may be paid in a short sale on one of their loans. While I wouldn't say that this is becoming the default value of the seconds (regardless of loan size), I won't be shocked if it is in another six months.
    • ^
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    Simple.... put in place your loan modification agreement with the first, immediately file a bankruptcy (Chapter 13), strip the 2nd as unsecured and then have the court approve the modification of the first within the plan.
    • ^
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    David,
    But aren't most second mortgages "recourse" debt that would be subject to recapture activity by the lender just like credit cards? The 2nd wouldn't be completely stripped would it?
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey as they needed to be to drum up maximum loan volume.

    It calls to mind an old Bob Seger lyric that should should have special resonance for Dick Kovacevich (chairman of Wells & former Norwest CEO):

    "She stood there bri
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
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    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
    • ^
    • v
    Wells routinely went into 2nd position behine Option ARMs. They simply noted the balance of any already existing first mortgage from the credit report and did not demand to see a copy of the Note to determine whether it had neg am potential. That they went into 2nd position behind Option ARMs is particularly odd given that they were not much into doing Option ARMs as first mortgages. I attribute the odd diverging risk tolerance to the fact that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was (and still is) largely run by the old Norwest mortgage folks from MN. When Norwest bought Wells, Norwest's generally conservative mortgage bosses kept running mortgage. The banking side of Wells was much more the province of the Californians. So, in typical gold-rush fashion, the banking side was as loosey-goosey ... (comment via Disqus by Morgan)
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    Visiting to test FriendFeed/Disqus Comment Sync. Great, I seen this works great on your FF.
 

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